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Article 4

The Supreme Court in the American ConstitutionalSystem
THE PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
CarlMcGowan*

I
In January of the year 1830, Senator Robert Y. Hayne, of
South Carolina, arose in his place to voice the deep and growing
concern of his constituents as to the part being played by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the American scheme of
government. He said:
It is not my desire to excite prejudice against the Supreme
Court. I not only entertain the highest respect for the individuals
who compose that tribunal but I believe they have rendered
important services to the country. . . . I object only to the
assumption of political power by the Supreme Court, a power
which belongs not to them and which they cannot safely
exercise.1

At about the same period in our national history, the governmental institutions of the New World were being examined by
an unusually gifted young European, Alexis de Tocqueville. In
his enduring classic, Democracy in America, published in 1835,
he characterized the judge in our system as:
[One] brought into the political arena independently of his own
will. He only judges the law because he is obliged to judge a
case; the political question which he is called upon to resolve is
connected with the interest of the parties and he cannot
refuse
2
to decide it without abdicating the duties of his post.

The sharply contrasting character of these observations, made
contemporaneously in point of time but in wholly different
settings, invites reflection. Senator Hayne's soft disclaimer of
any personal bias against the members of the Supreme Court,
followed closely by his harsh assertion that they had been fishing
* Member of the New York, Illinois and District of Columbia Bars. Member of
the firm of Ross, McGowan and O'Keefe, Chicago, Illinois.
1 Quoted in 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
723 (1926).
2 TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96 (1899).
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in political waters forbidden to them by the Constitution,
sounded a refrain which has echoed sporadically but persistently
throughout the life of the federal establishment.
Hayne spoke as a political leader in a movement to beat off
a threat to a significant sectional interest-slavery, and the
agricultural complex of which it was an essential element. He
was propounding the nullification doctrine of John Calhounthat a sovereign state need not be bound by federal laws antithetical to the state's interests, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's imprimatur of constitutionality. Calhoun and his adherents had become increasingly apprehensive of the eventual
danger to Southern economic and social institutions implicit in
the decisional trend of the Court of John Marshall towards a
strong and broadly-encompassing national power. Hayne, being
a politician, understood the curiously ambivalent attitude of
the American people towards the powers they have placed in
their judges-an attitude which enables phrases like "assumption of political power" to be used effectively as emotional
slogans to belabor the court which has given offense by its
judgment in a particular case.
Tocqueville, however, wrote only as a political and social
scientist, with an added dimension of detachment afforded by
his foreign nationality. Whatever the accuracy of his observations, they were neither clouded by personal involvement nor
motivated by the political objective of mobilizing the forces of
public opinion. He saw the judicial function in America as
inescapably intertwined with the political process as a whole;
and, with traditional Gallic realism, he concluded that the
judges had never been, and could not hope to be, immune from
the backlashes of contending political forces. Indeed, he may
have been foreshadowing one moral which perhaps can be
drawn from the Hayne statement itself-that the refusal to
recognize the relationship between political issues, on the one
hand, and the judicial process, on the other, gives a specious
support to the slur that a court, in resolving a controversy of
wide public interest, has improperly intruded itself into political
questions. If the people believe the relationship to be either nonexistent or always avoidable by judicial self-denial, a powerful
weapon is forged for the focussing of pressure upon the courts
by raising the hue and cry of political intercession.
Robert Hayne's name is now remembered chiefly as a convenient mode of reference to the devastating response he evoked
from Daniel Webster. Tocqueville, however, has continued to
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grow in stature, and his picture of mid-19th Century America
is eagerly examined today for illumination and instruction as we
enter the second half of the 20th. It would be wrong, nonetheless,
to suppose from this that the objective attitude of the one towards
the Supreme Court has gained universal acceptance, and that
that august institution has, over the long span of intervening
years, acquired a status of freedom from the charge that it
meddles from time to time in political matters outside its prescribed orbit. One need only be of the current generation to be
aware of the error of any such inference. The ordinary newspaper reader of today knows that the Court is repeatedly drawn
into the vortex of political discussion, where it is the subject of
vigorous criticism and sustained attack.
No institution of a truly democratic government can---or
should-expect to be beyond criticism with respect to particular
actions. This is as true of the Supreme Court as of the legislative
and executive branches of the government. But any institution,
and perhaps especially the Court, can fairly ask that strictures
upon its acts be addressed to the merits of those acts, and not
be masked in either innocent misunderstanding, or conscious
misrepresentation, of its function. The Court, because it sits at
the apex of a system of professional knowledge not easily accessible to laymen, is peculiarly exposed to both. Its history is full
of instances of this vulnerability.
A brief glance at the Court in some of its more tumultuous
phases may serve at least three purposes relevant to the discussion for which we are assembled today. First, it will show
how the Court's normal discharge of its responsibilities periodically places it in the very center of violent controversy. Second,
it will demonstrate that the recurring assaults upon it are diffuse
in their origins and are not the exclusive hallmark of any one
geographical area or of any one grouping of economic or social
interests. And, lastly, it will provide, for this moment in time,
the reassurance for our present alarms which is the gift of historical perspective.
II
The New York Times, in May of 1861, characterized the
then Chief Justice of the United States as "too feeble to wield the
sword against the Constitution, too old and palsied and weak to
march in the ranks of rebellion and fight against the Union, he
uses the powers of his office to serve the cause of the traitors."3
3

Quoted in 2 WAlnN, op. cit. supra at 370.
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The New York Tribune, addressing itself to the same grievance,
concluded its complaint with this remarkable admonition: "Let
us not be afraid of military despotism .... Of all the tyrannies
that afflict mankind, that of the Judiciary is the most insidious,
the most intolerable, the most dangerous." 4 These are, obviously,
strong words to flow from the pens of editorial writers for responsible newspapers. What was it, then, that prompted these
feverish outbursts of indignation?
In the early months of the Civil War, the Union Army had
seized and imprisoned a respected civilian resident of Baltimore.
The prisoner had applied to Chief Justice Taney, as the circuit
justice, for a writ of habeas corpus; and the Chief Justice had
issued the writ, commanding the prisoner to be brought into
court for an inquiry into the propriety of his arrest and detention.
The military officer upon whom the writ was served declined to
obey it; and Taney, in accordance with the usual procedure in
such a case, directed that contempt proceedings be instituted,
which proceedings were frustrated by the military's refusal to
permit the appropriate papers to be served. In this state of
affairs, Taney, who understood the realities of power and who
had thought already to have placed himself in personal jeopardy,
simply filed an opinion in which he held the arrest to be in
violation of the Constitution. He tempted fate one last degree
by directing that a copy of the opinion be sent to the President
of the United States, who, as a lawyer by trade, may conceivably have noted with interest what the opinion said but who,
as Commander in Chief in a nation at war, certainly gave it no
recognition in the disposition of this case.'
To us of a later generation whose emotions have become
reasonably disengaged from Civil War issues, it would seem
that the Chief Justice was rising to one of the greatest of our
national tradiions, namely, the assertion of the civil power as
against encroachments by the military. Indeed, in the highly
agitated temper of the times, we would suppose that the Chief
Justice had acted with singular courage and devotion. And yet
the outcry against him personally at the time was so bitter in
Northern quarters that it succeeded in causing, as we have seen
above, a prominent newspaper to advance the astonishing pro-

4

Ibid.

5 Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9487 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). Congress eventually passed a statute which, in effect, ratified the handling of this matter
by the Executive.
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position that the abiding dangers to the liberties of a free people
are to be found not in uncontrolled military force but in the
judiciary itself.
It may be said, of course, that Chief Justice Taney was
personally suspect because he had spoken for the Court four
years earlier in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.' In that case,
which had outraged the sensibilities of the North, the Supreme
Court had held unconstitutional an Act of Congress. The statute
so invalidated had rested upon an assumed power in the Congress
to exclude slavery from the territories; and, thus, when the
Court came to pass on that power, it found itself in the midst of
all of the passions which were boiling up to produce the war
between the states.
The vexation which the Northern newspapers had expressed
at the decision knew no bounds. The New York Tribune, for
example, said that "the Court has rushed into politics, voluntarily
and without other purpose than to subserve the cause of slavery."'7 Its Washington correspondent described the decision as
the subject of "mingled derision and contempt", and went on to
say that "if epithets and denunciation could sink a judicial
body, the Supreme Court of the United States would never be
heard of again."" The New York Post said:
[T]he moral authority and consequent usefulness of [the
Supreme Court] . . . is seriously impaired, if not destroyed
...
A majority of its members have consented to become
parties to a combination with the Administration to transfer
the political control of the government to the hands of the
slave oligarchy. 9

Chief Justice Taney, as the head of the Court and the writer
of the majority opinion, bore the brunt of the critical clamor;
and it is, therefore, not surprising that his first encounter with
the Union Army during the war itself should have made him
peculiarly subject to attack by the partisans of that Army. But
sectional feeling in this period of our history did not require a
scapegoat of Southern origins in order to, vent itself in slander
of the Court. A year and a half after the war was over, and at
a time when the Court had been reconstituted mainly by appointees of President Lincoln, the Court again came under
heavy attack because of its reassertion of the pre-eminence of
the civil over the military power.
6 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
7 Quoted in 2 WARREN, op. cit. supra at 304.

8 Quoted in 2 id. 305.
9 Quoted in 2 id. 307.
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Late in 1866 the Court decided the case of Ex parte Milligan." Here the Court was passing upon the propriety of the
arrest of a Southern sympathizer by the Union military authorities in Indiana, and his trial by a military commission in 1864.
Two of the Justices appointed by President Lincoln joined with
three of the prewar Court to hold that neither the President nor
the Congress had the authority under the Constitution to authorize the trial of civilians by military commissions in areas where
the civil courts were still open for business. The opinion itself
was written by the one of Lincoln's appointees who was also an
intimate personal friend of long standing-David Davis of
Illinois.
These significant differences in the personal backgrounds of
the Justices involved did not, however, save the Court from the
same kind of vituperative comment which had greeted Taney's
earlier brush with the military and presidential power. Said the
New York Times:
In the conflict of principle thus evoked, the States which sustained the cause of the Union will recognize an old foe with a
new face ....
The Supreme Court, we regret to find, throws

the great weight of its influence into the scale of those who
assailed the Union and step after step impugned the constitutionlity of nearly everything that was done to uphold it .... 11

The Indianapolis Journal, after a grudging admission that in a
proper case there was something to be said for subordinating
military power to the civil authority, concluded that this decision
was not to be absolved by this principle for the reason that "it
is intended only to aid the Johnson men, and is so clearly a
forerunner of other decisions looking to a defeat of Republican
ascendancy and to a restoration of Southern domination, that
the indignation against the Court is just and warranted." 2
Harper's Weekly described the decision as "not a judicial opinion; it is a political act"; 13 and the Washington Chronicle lamented that "the hearts of traitors will be glad by the announcement that treason, vanquished upon the battlefield and hunted
from every other retreat, has at last found a secure shelter in
the bosom of the Supreme Court."' 4 Such were some of the
contemporary judgments passed upon a decision which is now
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Quoted in 2 WARREN, OP. cit. supra at 429.
12 Quoted in 2 id. 429-30.
13 Quoted in 2 id. 432.
14 Quoted in 2 id. 433.
10
11
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generally looked upon as a long forward step in the age-old
struggle to establish the supremacy of civil processes over military might!
The Dred Scott case was only the second time in the then
68-year-old history of the Supreme Court that it had held an
Act of Congress unconstitutional. The criticisms of that decision
were not, however, addressed in the main to the existence of
such a power, but rather to the result of its exercise in the particular case. This was also true of the popular reaction to the
first occasion on which the Supreme Court had invalidated a
congressional statute-Marbury v. Madison,15 decided in 1803.
This decision evoked a storm of critical comment, but principally
for the political reason that the administration party did not like
the suggestions in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion that the
judiciary could, and might on occasion find it necessary to, sit
in judgment on the acts of the Executive branch of the government.
The matter at issue in Marbury v. Madison was whether a
minor officeholder, appointed in the expiring hours of the Adams
administration, was entitled to have his commission delivered to
him by the incoming administration of Thomas Jefferson. Although involving simply the legal right of an individual to claim
an unimportant office, the resolution of that issue had intensely
political overtones. Editorial comment in the press of the day
divided along the traditional party lines. A Jeffersonian paper
had this to say:
The efforts of Federalism to exalt the Judiciary over the
Executive and Legislative, and to give that favorite department
a political character and influence, may operate for a time to
come, as it has already, to the promotion of one party and the
depression of the other, but it will probably terminate in the
degradation and disgrace of the Judiciary. Politics are more
improper and dangerous in a Court of Justice, if possible, than
in the pulpit ....

The Court must be defeated and retreat from

the attack; or march on until they incur impeachment and removal from office .... 16

This case had the effect of marshaling against the Court the
individual influence of one formidable opponent, Thomas Jefferson. Throughout the many years remaining in his life, Jefferson

15 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For one politician-turned-author's admiring
account of another politician-turned-judge's adroitness in the handling of this troublesome case, the layman may find of interest Senator Beveridge's treatment of this
matter in 3 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL C. 3 (1919).
16 Quoted in 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra at 249.
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continually adverted to the sense of personal injustice he felt
about this decision. In 1807, for example, he wrote to a correspondent that "I have long wished for a proper occasion to have
the gratuitous opinion in Marbury v. Madison brought before
the public, and denounced as not law, and I think the present a
fortunate one, because it occupies such a place in the public
attention."' 7 Indeed, Jefferson's brooding about the slight which
he thought the decision represented to him caused him over the
years to magnify his resentment of a particular decision into a
feeling of hostility towards the Supreme Court generally. In
1820 he wrote: "The Judiciary of the United States is the subtle
corps of sappers and miners constantly working underground to
undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric."' 8 And
in 1821 he confided to Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia that:
The great object of my fear is the Federal Judiciary. That body
like gravity, ever acting, with noiseless foot, and unalarming
advance, gaining ground step by step, and holding what it gains,
is ingulphing insidiously the special governments into the jaws
of that which feeds them ....
Let the eye of vigilance never be
closed. 19

In circulating these complaints, Jefferson was able, in form
at least, to base them on a broader ground than mere personal
irritation at John Marshall's action in calling his administration
to account in a highly political context. As President he had on
occasion adopted a singularly latitudinarian construction of the
powers vested in the national government by the Constitution
-most manifest perhaps in the Louisiana Purchase and in his
efforts by the use of arbitrary restrictions upon ocean-going trade
to forestall involvement in the wars between France and England
(efforts which, incidentally, infuriated New England both with
Jefferson himself and the federal judges who uniformly sustained
them, and brought that stolidly loyal section of the country to
the very brink of secession). In his post-presidential period,
however, Jefferson reverted completely to his perennial suspicion
of a strong central government. He objected vigorously to the
Supreme Court's course in finding generous grants of national
power within the generalized clauses of the Constitution. He and
his adherents saw the fount of this evil, if such it was, in the
landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland" decided in 1819.
17
18
19

11 WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 215 (1904).
15 id. 297.
15 id. 326.

20

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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This was the case in which the Marshall Court laid down the
important doctrine that the federal powers are not confined to
those spelled out expressly in the Constitution but embrace as
well all things necessary and proper to the effective exercise of
the former. The particular controversy which evoked this significant gloss upon the basic charter was precipitated by the action
of the State of Maryland in levying a tax upon a creature of the
Federal Government in the person of the second Bank of the
United States. The Court held the Maryland law invalid as an
impermissible interference by a state with the operation of a
national agency in an area legitimately committed to it by the
Congress of the United States.
The Bank was not a popular institution, notably in the West
and South-those sections of the country which, in the earlier
years of the Republic as later, were peculiarly prone to economic
distress and which have never been behind-hand about embodying financial ills in political outcries. The period immediately
preceding the decision had been one of hard times, particularly
in the inland states; and, rightly or wrongly, the Bank was identified as the cause of these hardships. To those of this persuasion,
accordingly, the Court's action was anathema.
John Marshall himself took note of the storm in his private
correspondence with a fellow offender,2 1 saying:
Our opinion in the Bank case has aroused the sleeping spirit
of Virginia, if indeed it ever sleeps. It will, I understand, be

attacked in the papers with some asperity, and as those who
favor it never write for the publick, it will remain undefended
22
and of course be considered as damnably heretical.

A Tennessee editor wrote:
This Court, above the law and beyond the control of public
opinion, has lately made a decision that prostrates the state
sovereignty entirely. The extraordinary determination to prevent
the states taxing the capital of the United States Bank, and the
decree declaring the state insolvent laws unconstitutional has
awakened public attention to the aristocratical character of the

Court, and must sooner or later bring down on the members of
it the execration of the community... . We are consoled with

21 Justice Joseph Story of Massachusetts. One of the first appointments to the
Court which fell to the Jeffersonians, and affiliated with that party himself at the
time of his selection, Story soon found his mind paralleling that of John Marshall
in grappling with the great issues coming before the Court. The Court's history is,
of course, happily ornamented with many instances of similarly disappointed
expectations.
22 Quoted in 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra at 515.
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the idea that the public opinion will not support the Supreme
Court. Our government
is made for the people, not the people
23
for governors.

And a journal in Georgia purported to see in the decision "an
unusual appearance upon our political horizon, and if not big
with disaster, at least alarming in aspect . . . when another
Supreme Court shall sit in judgment on the State laws, depend
upon it, the crisis is at hand; the moderation of a generous and
forbearing people will be tried to the bottom. 24
It was not, however, the legendarily volatile and hot-tempered Southerners who translated their indignation at the Court
into active defiance. Below the Mason and Dixon line, there was
sound and fury in plenty, but it was only in that meeting ground
of the sober virtues of the East and the Middle West-Ohio-that dissidence erupted into disobedience. Here, financial stringency had been felt most severely, and hostility to the Court's
decision--cloaked in concern about states' rights-was most
lacking in moderation.
A few days before the Court struck down the Maryland tax,
the Ohio legislature had enacted a patently punitive annual
levy upon each branch of the Bank within the state; and the
Ohio officials, strongly supported by popular opinion, determined to enforce their law despite its obvious illegality under
the reach of the McCulloch decision. In open disregard of an
injunction against such enforcement issuing out of the Federal
Circuit Court, those officials seized assets of the Bank by force.
Even the Southern papers, which had been highly vocal in
criticizing the Supreme Court's outlawing of the Maryland
statute, found this strong medicine indeed, and began to draw
distinctions between verbal complaints, on the one hand, and
rebellious conduct, on the other.
The embattled Buckeyes, however, were wholly unrepentant.
The State Treasurer continued to defy orders of the Federal
Court to return the Bank's money and eventually found himself committed to prison for contempt. With his personal guardianship removed in this convenient manner, federal officials
physically recovered the disputed funds from his office. The
immediate controversy thus ended with the citizens of Ohio
loudly lamenting the failure of their similarly aggrieved sister
states to the South to rally actively to the support of their effort
to maintain the rights of a sovereign state against the oppressions
23
24

Quoted in 1 id. 519-520.
Quoted in 1 id.520.
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of the central government-encroachments which, so the Ohioans stubbornly persisted in saying, did not become legal simply
because the Supreme Court said they were.25
I
The preceding events were but a few of the violent controversies which swirled about the heads of the Justices of the
Supreme Court during the first century of its existence. The
close of its second hundred years is almost in view, but the
pattern has been no different. One product of the Civil War,
for example, was the fourteenth amendment, with its charter
of restrictions upon state action. That has been a most abundant
source of violent involvement of the Court in the ebb and flow
of political and social tension.
There was that long period from the close of the last century
through the great depression of the 1930's when the Court's
assiduous assertion of freedom of contract and the rights of
property kindled a resentment against it among the economic
liberals which found voice in indefensibly intemperate expressions of hostility. This, coupled with a period of narrow construction of federal powers invoked in aid of programs hastily
devised to break the grip of economic stagnation, culminated in
the extraordinary spectacle of a President at the summit of his
popularity convening a press conference to denounce the Court
as a barrier to the national ideal of self-government. Latterly,
the Court's preoccupation with the fourteenth amendment as a
guarantee of personal and social rights has precipitated another
crisis in which the shadow of John Calhoun has once again
fallen across a sizable sector of the land. Small wonder, then,
that one of the wisest of the Court's members in its second
century-Oliver Wendell Holmes---once said of it: "We are
very quiet there, but it is the quiet of a storm centre, as we all
know. 2' 8 Why is it that this must be so?
The Constitution of the United States says simply that "the
Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
25 When the legal proceedings in Ohio finally were passed upon by the Supreme
Court several years later, the decision confirmed the national sovereignty in all
respects. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824). This
decision, however, prompted relatively little controversy in Ohio, for the reason
that improving business conditions had caused a corresponding loss of interest in the
battle for states' rights.
26

HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 292 (1920).
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from time to time ordain and establish. '2 7 Itgoes on to say,
however, that "the Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;"2 and it then enumerates certain specific
classes of controversies, such as those between citizens of different states, which are within the scope of this grant.
The key words for our purposes are three--"the Judicial
Power." Whatever else the Framers of the Constitution meant
by their authorship of the judicial article-however broad or
however narrow were their conscious intentions with respect to
the scope of the functions they sought to vest in the Supreme
Court by the words they used-they were referring, in the phrase
"the Judicial Power," to a standard of universally-accepted content in at least one important sense. This was the idea that courts
exist to resolve controversies between man and man, and between
man and government. These concepts were familiar to the people
who made the Constitution, reaching back at least as far as the
rudimentary beginnings in our Anglo-Saxon heritage of a
machinery provided by the early Kings of England for the administration of justice among, and to, their subjects of all degree.
And this, of course, was no more than a recognition of the fact
that men cannot live in an organized and stable social order
without some means of peaceful accommodation of the conflicts which inevitably develop among them.
The essence of judicial power is that it is a solvent of personal
frictions, whether they grow out of the relationships of individuals to each other, or of the individual, on the one hand, and
the collectivity of mankind represented by the state, on the
other. When the clash comes, it is the judicial power which must
settle it, if a society is to be ordered by reason rather than by
superior force alone, which is the very negation of civilized
living. The idea is really a very simple one, and it should be no
occasion for wonder that the Framers found it unnecessary to
use more than a few plain words to embody it. The striking
scarcity of discussion of the judicial article in the Constitutional
Convention at Philadelphia in itself suggests that the members
considered that, in this instance, they were dealing with a selfevident principle.
This is not to say that the wise and experienced men who
27
28

U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
Id. § 2.
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created the Federal Government failed to appreciate the immensity of the task they were devolving upon the Supreme Court,
or that they did not anticipate the controversial character of the
role they were fashioning for it to play. They were too sophisticated not to know that the way of the peacemaker is hard, that
he who sits in judgment will inevitably become the focus of the
passions of those against whom the judgment goes. What they
certainly knew was that, without the function of judgment, the
ship they were launching would surely founder.
Neither is it to be supposed that they were so naive as to think
that the judges could be above the sturm und drang of partisan
strife. There are, of course, many law suits which are of little or
no interest to those other than the immediate parties. But there
are also the big cases-big in the sense that many people are
interested in the outcome, whose economic or other interests are
directly affected, or whose emotions are engaged by the contending principles involved. This is the stuff of politics in the
larger sense, and we can almost hear the gentle, disbelieving
chuckle of Benjamin Franklin if he had been told that the Court
he was helping to create was to be above the clamor because its
functions were completely tangential to the surging streams of
political life.
Indeed, the evidence as to the understanding of the Framers
in this regard is just the other way. Knowing that the judges
must surely become on occasion the focal point of controversy,
and knowing also that they neither could nor should be endowed
with the usual weapons of political power-the direct appeal for
votes, the resources of patronage, the spending of public fundsthey gave the Court the protection of life terms, hedged about
by an unusually intricate impeachment process and an absolute
guaranty against diminution of compensation. They saw to it,
in short, that the branch of the new government which they
summoned into being for the assumption and exercise of ultimate political power whenever that proved necessary for the
doing of justice was deceptively armored by an apparent lack of
political power in its more immediate and superficial aspects,
while at the same time its foundations were securely anchored
in minimum, but virtually unbreakable, guarantees of personal
independence. For the discharge of its great tasks, the Court is
at once weak and strong. But in that paradox there is a strength
which its architects knew to be of elemental necessity if it were
to survive the rigors inseparable from the-effective performance
of its assigned function.
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That function remains what it always was and what it always
will be under any society which pretends to live under law-the
disposition of disputes by reference to those rules, however
embodied, which make up the law. It is the peculiar position of
the Supreme Court, however, that the disputes which fall to it
for decision are governed by principles which have a special
political origin and purpose. This is notably true of that set of
rules we call the Federal Constitution, and a court which must
resolve a controversy before it by reference to the terms of that
document is, of necessity, operating in a highly political context.
There are many who feel that the genius of our Constitution
resides in the generality of its language, with the scope that gives
for adaptability to change and growth. Whether this be true or
not, the fact is that the constitutional grants and limitations are
couched in verbalizations of a most imprecise nature. This has
the effect of causing the final interpreter to be engaged in what
approaches a continuous process of constitution-making; and,
indeed, the Supreme Court, in this aspect of its work, has been
likened to a permanent constitutional convention.
The point is that if the controversies which arise daily are to
be resolved by a judicial power functioning within the framework of broad constitutional rules, the Court's role could not be
otherwise. And if the Court must actually decide cases against
this background, it cannot hope to be completely isolated from
the dust and heat of political contention. It never has been; it
never will be. What it-and we-can hope is that there may be
understanding of the inevitability of this state of affairs so long
as we, as a people, hold the view that any civilized government
provides independent judicial tribunals where men may assert
what they believe to be their rights and secure a determination of
them.
This point-which seems to me to be of critical importance
to the theme of our meeting today-perhaps can be restated in
another way. If we accept and require the peaceful resolution of
controversies as they arise by the exercise of an independent
judicial power, then we must be prepared to pay the price that
some of those controversies will have political consequences,
thereby laying the tribunal itself open to a charge by the unsuccessful litigant that it has wrongfully assumed political power
or, at the least, has improperly reflected political considerations
in the result reached. We cannot have it both ways. If we want
a judicial power to decide our cases, we must recognize that
this in itself is a basic political decision; and that, accordingly,
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the exercise of judicial power is political in this fundamental
sense. And if we want all our cases to be amenable to the
judicial power, and not merely those which are politically colorless, we must be prepared to weigh the disappointment some of
us may feel with particular decisions in the light of the considerations which led us as a people to evolve the judicial power
as a factor in our plan of government.
The way in which the seemingly small and unimportant lawsuit may become tossed upon the seething political tides of the
times is evident if we will look back for a moment at some of the
cases which agitated the country in its first century. Marbury v.
Madison, after all, was prompted by the feeling of an individual
that he had been arbitrarily and unfairly denied a job to which
he had been lawfully appointed. In our scale of values, if a man
really wants to be a justice of the peace and thinks he has been
illegally deprived of his right to be one, we believe he has a right
to a judicial determination of his claim. Ordinarily, this matter
would be of little interest to anyone other than the claimant
himself, but it became a big case in this instance because the
resolution of this trivial matter turned upon principles which
were of wide interest indeed. Out of this inconsequential set of
facts came some conclusions of tremendous significance, notably
the assumption by the Court of power to invalidate acts of Congress and the suggestion that the Court will, if requisite to the
doing of justice to the individual litigant before it, define the
legitimate sphere of action of the Executive. In this latter connection, it was only a relatively short time ago that the steel
industry of the United States successfully invoked the protection
of the Court against Presidential seizure.29 The immediate stakes
were larger than those involved in Marbury v. Madison, but the
principle of the Court's authority was the same.
McCulloch v. Maryland was simply an effort by a taxpayer to
assert the impropriety of the tax imposed-a right of proceeding
which we believe in as firmly today as our ancestors did in the
early 1800's. But the Court could not resolve this one dispute
without exploring the explosive subject of the lines of demarcation between the federal government and the states.

29 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Black,
speaking for the Court in rejecting the powers claimed by the President over the
labor problem in issue, held that the Framers had vested such powers only in Congress; and he referred to "the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay
behind their choice." Id. at 589.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXIII

Dred Scott himself was only a slave who was suing his master
for his freedom, but the private lawsuit of these two persons had
reference to opposed principles for which literally millions of
Americans were prepared to battle to the death. Although this
decision was one of what Charles Evans Hughes once called the
Court's "self-inflicted wounds," it seems unlikely that any different decision or any different treatment of the points involved
would have saved the Court from outcry or would have dispersed the gathering clouds of national disunion. And yet no
one would say that a human being who asserts a right as fundamental as that pursued by Dred Scott should not be able to go to
court and get a decision, although the times are unpropitious in
the sense that any decision will provoke dangerous reactions.
In Ex parte Milligan, the controversy before the Court presented the important issue of the citizen's right to protection
from arbitrary action by his government. Again, the timing of
this adjudication was most inconvenient in that the passions inflamed by the Civil War had not subsided and a decision upholding the right claimed carried implications of rebuke to an
heroic Army and a martyred President. But convenience in these
terms is not a characteristic of any judicial system with pretensions to real integrity and independence.
The great cases, thus, have their seeds in the day-to-day
interests and experiences of individual citizens. The Court has
no control over the depth or timing of the personal sense of outrage or frustration which sets in motion the lawsuit which one
day may reach it for final resolution. Moreover, the Court must,
in arriving at its decision, take into account all those matters
which are relevant. This may well mean that, in order to do
justice as between the litigants, the Court must construe the
meaning of an Act of Congress or even declare it to be invalid
altogether; or say that the President of the United States has
overstepped the bounds of action permitted to him by the Constitution; or nullify the efforts of a state legislature to prescribe
laws for the people it represents; or overturn the judgments of
the highest courts of the states in matters of federal concern; or
direct all governments, state and federal, to accord those assurances of personal rights which it derives from its reading of the
Federal Bill of Rights.
These are the things the Court does; and, it seems fair to say,
these are the things which we have commonly consented that it
should do. This being so, there is little profit in debating their
characterization as political or otherwise. What can be readily
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seen is that the Court, in doing these things, is certain to collide
with firmly-held opinions and deep emotional attachments which
themselves find expression in political terms. This in itself makes
it certain that the Court periodically must find itself the center
of political tempests. Were it otherwise, we might have a real,
albeit a different, cause for concern about the current state of
health of the judicial power.
IV
The critics of the Supreme Court in its periods of turbulence
have, thus, freely resorted to the charge that it has reached out
for political power. Over the years this claim has been made by
a succession of groups spanning the entire spectrum of sectional
and social interests. This, as we have also seen, is unavoidable
if the Court is to exercise from case to case the judicial power
committed to it by the Constitution.
This constitutional grant is, however, stated in the traditionally broad terms, and the Court has, accordingly, considerable
latitude for the definition of the power granted. In addition, it
has assumed some measure of prerogative in determining the
occasions for the exercise, or the withholding of the exercise, of
judicial power. The thread which runs through these is one of
discretionary self-denial-the discharge of what Justice Frankfurter has called "one very important and very troublesome
aspect of the Court's functioning - its duty not to decide."3 0
These actions go far to negate the accusations of conscious
political encroachment.
Early in the life of the new nation, President Washingtoh
found himself with the difficult problem of maintaining neutrality
in the conflicts of France and England. The country was sharply
divided into active partisans of the two belligerents, although
the national interest of the young and struggling nation was
obviously to stay aloof from both. France in particular pressed
its popularity as a recent ally by using our ports as fitting-out
points for privateers and as forums for prize adjudications. There
was real doubt as to whether American shipowners who were
victims of these activities could seek redress in the federal courts.
The President considered such jurisdiction to be vital to his
policy of neutrality, and he was dismayed when a district judge
at Philadelphia held himself to be powerless in this area. Presi-
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dent Washington then directed his Secretary of State to address
an inquiry on his behalf to the Supreme Court, which contained
these words:
The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe
produces frequent transactions within our ports and limits, on
which questions arise of considerable difficulty.... The President would, therefore, be much relieved if he found himself
free to refer questions of this description to the opinions of the
Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, whose knowledge of the subject would secure us as against errors dangerous
to the peace of the United States. .. . He has therefore asked
the attendance of such of the Judges as could be collected in
time for the occasion, to know, in the first place, their opinion,
whether the public may, with propriety, be availed of their
advice on these questions. And if they may, to present, for
their advice, the abstract questions which have already occurred,

or may soon occur.

....31

To this letter were appended 29 questions involving the meaning of treaties and the rules of international law, prepared at the
President's direction by Alexander Hamilton although he himself regarded the inquiry as improper.
Chief Justice Jay and his associates-all appointees, and
many, personal friends, of the President-were greatly troubled
by this submission, but at length the Chief Justice replied for
the Court and respectfully declined to follow the course suggested as constituting extra-judicial action. Thus was there
early laid to rest any thought that the Court either could or
should render advisory opinions on abstract legal questions not
presented to it in actual controversies. It happens to be a practice which is followed by the highest courts of some states at this
moment, but the Supreme Court of the United States has never
considered that the judicial power in its charge extends to any
legal issues not shaped for decision in an actual case or controversy. Moreover, it has normally been alert to keep from
being tricked into such a course by feigned disputes and sham
lawsuits. Its purpose is to protect its jurisdiction from being
imposed upon by parties whose interests in the matter at issue
are neither substantial nor truly opposed.
A second means by which the Court has sought to limit its
exposure on the political front is to be found in its so-called
"political questions" doctrine. The Court has on occasion declined to rule on the merits of a case because it presents, in the
Court's phrase, a political, rather than a judicial, question. This
31

9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 167-168 (1904).
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has a somewhat paradoxical sound in view of what has been
said above, but the doctrine has not been of great consequence
as a practical matter and there are those who feel that it is one
of the least satisfactory of the Court's jurisdictional reservations.
Its significance for our discussion is that it emphasizes the
Court's reluctance to rush into political areas. It was first spelled
out in detail by the Court in 1845 in a case cast up by a bitter
political struggle in Rhode Island known as Dorr's Rebellion.
One faction took over the government of the state under the
authority of a new constitution, and the issue in the case at bar
turned upon the legality of the attempted substitution of a new
system of government for the one in being. The sympathies of
the two prevailing national political parties divided on party
lines between the contenders in Rhode Island; and, since eight
of the Supreme Court judges were of the same party, it was
widely assumed that the faction favored by their party would
win. This cynical expectation proved groundless, however, when
the Court unanimously concluded not to pass upon the issue,
which it characterized as one of purely political power, not
appropriate for judicial decision but to be left for resolution to
the political agencies of the state.
Latterly, the political question doctrine has been applied in
cases where challenge is made to the acts or omissions of state
legislatures in apportioning congressional representation or the
drawing of election districts. 32 A counterpart of this doctrine is
one of more recent vintage, namely, the Court's recognition of
the wide latitude to be accorded acts by the President in the
conduct of the external relations of the nation. 33 As national
politics have become increasingly preoccupied with international
issues, it will be seen that this self-denying standard is a long
step away from the center of political control.
A third circumscription by the Supreme Court of the area of
judicial power is its rejection of the theory of a federal common
law. The Court reached this result haltingly and only after
several false starts. In its early years it appeared to assume that
there was a federal common law of crimes, but it at length
32 For a very recent and vigorous criticism of the federal courts for their inaction in this field, see Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71
HAIv. L. REv. 1057 (1958). It is of interest here to note that this well-reasoned
reaction comes from one who is technically a layman, although Mr. Lewis, in his
careful preparation for, and his effective performance of, his present assignment of
covering the Supreme Court for the New York Times, had already lost most of his
amateur standing before this article appeared.
33 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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abandoned this approach in favor of the doctrine that only those
acts which Congress, in the exercise of powers reposed in it by
the Constitution, expressly defines as crimes and for which it
provides punishments by statute can be considered as federal
crimes. 34 For many years longer there persisted within the Court
the principle that the Court could make its own law in the
general commercial field, but this was finally laid aside by the
Court as recently as 1938 .3 This voluntary renunciation has
carved a large area out of the Court's potential range of power.
Lastly, there are the self-originated canons of judicial administration which the Court has observed in varying, frequently
uneven, but significantly continuous, degrees. These include,
notably, the rule that the Court will avoid the resolution of constitutional issues tendered to it if the case can be made to turn
on less exalted-and normally less provocative-grounds. An
incidental effect of this rule is to provide the Court with some
room to defer the decision of constitutional questions past the
time when they are uppermost in the popular mind and when
the consciousness of change has not created an atmosphere of
acceptance of the Court's solution. The mere existence of the
canon is a self-imposed, but nonetheless compelling, limitation
upon the Court's reaching out to mould the political structure.
Another of these canons is the deference which the Court
pays to the determinations of state law and the construction of
state statutes by the state courts, and the Court's care to search
for adequate state law grounds upon which to rest a decision
brought to it for review. A corollary of this is the restraints which
the Supreme Court applies, in the discharge of its task of supervising the lower federal courts, for the purpose of preventing the
latter from interfering with the normal functioning of the state
judicial, legislative, and administrative processes.
These are but a few of the ways in which the Supreme Court
on its own motion seeks to strike a proper balance between the
judicial power entrusted to it, and the powers committed to
other agencies of government, be they state or federal. We may
feel from time to time that the Court has wavered in these
objectives or been something less than completely faithful to its
own professions in this regard. There is, however, an identifiable and permanent pattern and, in the long view, it seems fair
United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 415 (1816).
35 Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
34
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to say that this is one tradition where the honors lie with the
observance rather than the breach.
V
I recall being present on one occasion when Robert Jackson,
then Solicitor General of the United States and later to be a
Justice of the Supreme Court, was addressing a group of lawyers.
This was the period in the late 30's when the lines of decision of
the Court were undergoing a rapid transformation, and the
scope and pace of this alteration were alarming to many. He was
asked a question as to the meaning and longer-range implications of a case which had just come down to the accompaniment of a considerable amount of head-shaking.
His reply I have always found to be enormously sensible. He
said: "I think it means that someone has just won a lawsuit."
And he went on to add that he found it both useful and timesaving to reflect that speculations as to the future significance of
today's lawsuits yield to the practical principle that each generation can, and will, dispose of its own lawsuits in its own way.
This has some of the advocate's art of over-simplification,- but
it is also a shrewd perception, and one which I hope may be
instructive for this meeting. For it is the business of courts in
general, and of the Supreme Court in particular, to decide lawsuits. If we think we want or need courts at all, this is the work
we want them to do. But it is not work which can be done in a
vacuum, because there is a continuing vitality in Tocqueville's
statement that "scarcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial
question."
The act of decision inescapably creates disappointment; and
disappointment releases itself in criticism, which may in many
cases be well-founded. But it is one thing to be critical of the
Court's handling of particular issues, and quite another to
carry attack to the point of obscuring the mature of the judicial
function in such manner as to risk its permanent impairment.
Justice Holmes once said of criticism of the latter sort that it
bespoke "an unrest that seems vaguely to wonder. whether -law
and order pay.".
For nihilism of this kind, the antidote is understandingunderstanding of the great role we have assigned to the Court
to play.-Happily, this.understanding is.not the professional secret
of lawyers. It is open to the lay public as well.

